if the U.S. administration has yet to realize that there are other radical groups, who may have not pledged the allegiance to ISIS officially, but revolve in its orbit as per their statements, then there is a problem
On August 10th, the Pentagon announced that a small number of on-the-ground troops were taking part in military activities against the Islamic State in Libya. Although there was no clear detailed answer as to the nature of this support to the forces loyal to Libya’ Government of National Accord (GNA), deputy Press Secretary Gordon Trowbridge said that "They are not on the front lines, nor are they on the ground in Sirte."
For its part, the GNA stated previously in August that “the US operations will not exceed Sirte and its suburbs and these operations will be in a specified time frame.” As long as there is cooperation and recognition, the GNA does not appear to have a problem with the presence of foreign forces supporting the fight against ISIS.
This stands in contrast to the discontent the GNA expressed about the presence of French troops supporting the army in the east of Libya, describing this act as a violation of Libyan national sovereignty. Interestingly, the GNA – considered as the army’s commander of chief according to the political agreement signed in Skhirat, Morocco – requested that the US operations not exceed Sirte, even though the same enemy, extremists, exists in the east.
After the signing of the political agreement, a range of new institutions emerged and were mandated with the responsibility of leading the country and addressing the security and the economic challenges. Among these institutions, is the "Government of The National Accord", which is internationally recognized and has received an enormous support from the international community.
This government, which yet to gain the confidence vote from the parliament in Tobruq, faces several challenges. A look at the Presidential Council of this government stresses that the government of the national accord in and of itself needs a national accord.
The presidential council of Libya's new government is plagued by internal problems, the most significant of which is the boycott of the council by two of its members: Omar Alaswad, the minister of state for the western region, and Ali Qatrani, the deputy prime minister for the eastern region of the country. Both men are known for their devoted support of General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) recognized by the parliament.
The international world has been frustrated by the warring Libyan groups thus far, in large part because they have been unable to agree on a workable solution for the conflict.
In addition, there is no Libyan party capable of marshalling up the necessary manpower, machinery, or political clout to decisively sew up the conflict, especially militarily. This circumstance necessitated the acceleration of the political agreement after its negotiation took longer than one year, leading to a government born on life support. It seems that "Friends of Libya" mistakenly thought that reaching a political settlement hastily would yield a sovereign body that would tackle two main issues today in Libya: the fragmentation of power and legitimacy.
In an article published in the Journal Foreign Policy, Tarek Megerisi suggests that " Haftar is an odd and much misunderstood piece in the wider Libyan puzzle.” Unfortunately, the situation is littered with other figures even less understood. Hafter came to the scene as a result of an emergency, clearly manifested lack of security and a stunning rise in assassinations. Megerisi also admits so.
Nevertheless, there are other parties active in Libyan politics whose motivations and roles are not subjected to the same necessary scrutiny. These parties have been present and active on the Libyan map politically and militarily since the collapse of Gaddafi regime, and certainly before the onset of the Haftar’s “Dignity Operation”. Yet they continue to act unfettered by a serious investigation into their backgrounds and vision for Libya’s political future. Libya – along with its political actors, national ambitions, and nebulous security situation – remains a black box for Western policy makers.
The US administration believes that the end of Islamic state in Libya will result in the elimination of terrorism in the country, or at least a reduction in the danger posed to US national security. Obama has recently met with some members of the National Security Council and military leaders from Pentagon where he expressed his support for a military action against ISIS in Sirte. He said that “ the strikes serve the US national security interests, and this reflects the administration’s commitment to support the Libyan government which has requested an intervention." However, if the US has yet to realize that there are other radical groups, who may have not pledged the allegiance to ISIS officially, but revolve in its orbit as per their statements, then there is a problem. Equally at fault is the GNA, which is more focused on who fills the ranks of those fighting against ISIS and other extremists – particularly Hafter – than on the threat posed by the terrorists themselves.
The international community has a moral and legal responsibility to intervene in Libya in order to protect civilians – which was the original impetus for the NATO mission against Gaddafi regime. Now Gaddafi is gone, but Libyans are stilling being targeted by extremists. The government is so consumed with politics instaed of containing the real enemy that exists not only in Sirte but also in other Libyan cities.
For instance, Ansar Al-Sharia Battalion was officially established in Benghazi in May of 2012 after its separation from the Raf’allah Al-Sehati Battalion, February 17 Battalion and Libya Shield 1 in the Eastern Region (Benghazi). As of August 2014, these main four battalions, along with other small brigades, came together to compose what is called today “The Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries.” All of these battalions have roots in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had notable influence on the General National Congress through its parliamentary bloc, “Loyalty to the Blood of the Martyrs,” along with the Libyan political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Justice and Construction Party.
These groups established themselves with the idea of implementing Sharia law by force - not only within the national Libyan borders, as it was in the founding ideology of the LIFG, but it goes beyond that to the national borders of other countries.
While they have publically kept their distance from each other and refrained from acting as allies, the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries and ISIS have proven capable of doing what the dueling governments of Tripoli and Tobruk cannot: come together in the face of a common enemy. This is evident from a statement made on December 28, 2015, by the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, in which the latter addressed the Islamic State affably and kindly, urged the rejection of dissensions, and ostentatiously declared that they were engaged in combat against Khalifa Haftar, the "West's Infidel client."
It is worth noting that ISIS in Sirte sprang from two main groups: defectors from Ansar Al-Sharia in Sirte, and an existing Islamic extremist group in Derna called MAJLIS SHURA SHABAB AL-ISLAM (The Islamic Youth Shura Council, or MSSI) which was founded during March 2014.
By June 2014, the MSSI announced its allegiance (Baya) to ISIS which took over the city and imposed Islamic laws in different aspects of life. Be that as it may, the MSSI was not the only radical group in Derna. The Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, which was established and led by a former member of the LIFG, Salim Derby, on December 2014, was the main opponent to the MSSI. The two groups had been involved in several clashes over power and resources in the city. Ever since, the MSSI was defeated and had to withdraw to Sirte, establishing their foothold within Libya.
Aaron Y. Zelin, from the Washington Institute, said that "ISIS did not have to start from scratch when establishing itself in the area. Sirte was the first city in which Ansar Alsharia (ASL) operated outside its base in Benghazi, beginning in late June 2013.”
The security landscape in Libya is complex and rife with groups whose history implies a pattern of action similar to that of ISIS.
Ahmed Abu Khtalh, the commander of the Abu Ubaidah Ibn Al-Jarrah battalion, a local Ansar Al-Sharia affiliate militia, was one of the suspects in the 2012 terrorist assault on the American Consulate in Benghazi. In a comprehensive analysis titled "Libya after Qaddafi," the National Security Research Division of the RAND Corporation stated that "the February 17 Brigade was the group responsible for the protection of the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi prior to the attack on September 11, 2012.” This in and of itself reflects a fatal failure in the US foreign policy, a failure to identify a nascent threat that would ultimately transform into the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. Equally by going forward, the same failed scenario would occur again after defeating ISIS in Sirte, because the same enemy being fought against there is still being disregarded elsewhere.
The GNA appears to be equally perplexed by the broad range of armed organizations present throughout the nation, despite the de facto legitimacy and appeals to restrict Western military intervention within the country. More than 22 people were killed recently on August 2 when a suicide bomber hit a group of Libyan troops who were part of General Khalifa Haftar's army. The presidential council of the GNA issued a statement condemning the attack and expressing its support for the army members, but it attributed this terrorist operation to ISIS, not to the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, despite the fact that the Saraya Media Center, the media wing of the group, claimed responsibility for the attack on its official Twitter page.
Struggling to maintain its legitimacy, the GNA portrays itself as the gatekeeper to Libya, holding the keys to the country's security if only their enemies were vanquished, but it seems that it's unable to untangle the intricate network of opposing terrorists groups operating in Libya.
Ignoring the presence of jihadist groups outside of Sirte would have catastrophic effects on both the nation and the region as time has shown that Ansar al-Sharia, which was formerly thought of as a regular militia not posing any threat to security, is capable of causing serious harm. It is perplexing and illusory to target ISIS in Sirte while ignoring other extremist organizations like the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, which was also founded by Ansar Alsharia. If the US and the GNA, as well as the rest of the international community, are serious about putting an end to terrorism in Libya, they must adopt a new strategy.
The appeals to fight terrorism in Libya should not be directed only towards ISIS, but it also must be against all Islamist groups that espouse violence to achieve their goals.
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